Topic: Naval Combat in the Classical Age

[Strategy]

I've been wondering a deal recently about how exactly Ancient naval combat functioned on a tactical basis. Did ships face each other off in prolonged standoffs while maintaining lines. The use of the line astern formation which was a line-penetrating formation certainly seems to suggests something of that kind to my land-crab mind. The kyklos (defensive circle) also shows that maintaining position in the face of enemy forces was not unheard of. But how exactly did they do that? What exactly happened when two lines faced each other?

Or alternatively did the entire thing degenerate into one big brawl (hollywood style)? Essentially, I am wondering just how representative the system I have lined up for Imperium is in respect to history.

While I have found a number of books (mostly old) discussing the importance of sea power and the strategy/deployment issues, I have yet to find even a single one which does for naval warfare what Goldsworthy/Sabin/Zhmodikov and others do for Roman warfare - i.e., attempt a reconstruction of what exactly happened on the field of battle. Anyone have any useful reading suggestion on this issue?

[Nikanarchon]

Hi Imperator.
Have something on this, but not to the same detail as Sabin etc for land-battles. My impression is that they tried to maintain formations or at least contiguous lines to avoid someone nipping thru and causing chaos in the backfield. Shall give you the ref tonight.
The kyklos you have mentioned, another tactic to avoid (or counter) breakthrough was double or multiple lines, so if an enemy ship made it thru the first line, it faced a second line.
This book is useful in that it tries to deduce staff (although mainly about the ships) from the historically recorded incidents.

[Nikanarchon]

OK Imperator, the book you will probably find most useful is:
'Greek and Roman Oared Warships 399BC to 30BC'
J.S.Morrison with contributions by J.F.Coates
Oxbow Books 1996. ISBN 0 900188 07 4
printed in UK by Alden Press, Oxford.
420 pages, 20 maps, 7 plans, 97 photos and drawings.
This is an incredibly meticulous coverage of all source material on naval warfare in the time period, and the implications for the ships and how they were used.
In my opinion Morrison sometimes takes the ancient authors at face value too readily, particularly Livy who I feel often embellished scant source material in to a ripping good yarn.
However, I still rate this book as good as it gets on ancient naval matters in the Hellenistic age.

[Strategy]

Attempting to maintain line in the face of an enemy fleet sounds good - this is relatively easy to model (and also what the currently designed system is aiming for). I will swiftly be getting hold of Morrison. Thanks.

[Nikanarchon]

Well actually, it is only the less manouevrable fleet which is anxious to maintain a line. The more manouevrable one is trying to break through (diekplous) or go around (periplous). The more manouevrable fleet had an interest in the action being more chaotic which would be achieved by diekplous or periplous. They could then manouevre more freely to achieve rams and oar-rakes, and to avoid being grappled.
Even a corvus-equipped fleet would have difficulty if the enemy could manouevre freely in its rear, ramming or raking or wrecking steering gear at the rear of the ships where the corvus wasn't able to bear.
However, part of the more manouevrable fleet's intention would presumably also be to bring greater numbers to bear at the point(s) of their choosing. In a chaos even much more manouevrable ships would prefer operating with superiority of numbers (although could achieve evasion even if out-numbered).
So the more manouevrable fleet presumably want the chaos but with their own ships in close mutual support of one another. Have to say this last point is somewhat speculative, but in my opinion follows from the preceding points which are better evidenced.

[Nikanarchon]

There is one classic Hollywood movie (I'll try to dig the name) which besides the unhistorical naval battle, if you look closely, you can see a truck driving down the hillside in the background.

Returning to more serious matters, a standard tactic of the less manouevrable fleet would obviously be to anchor one wing on a coastline, which obviously avoids any risk of the periplous/outflanking on that flank.

Other counters. Have mentioned the doubled line and you have mentioned the kyklos (although don't remember its use in our period, and the bigger ships would have made it tougher to execute.

As you probably know, deck artillery became widespread in this period, as well as use of archers/javelinmen. Also early use of firepots (but not flamethrowers) and an interesting one of dropping pots of venomous snakes. Be interested to see how you program that!  

[Strategy]

I cheat.  

No, I have a copy of Martin Johncock's Naumachiae, which treats (as far as I can see) just about every weapon system used by the ancient galleys. Both towers, light artillery (limited range but can be used for close support in boarding) heavy artillery (long range only), reinforced rams, corvus, harpago, use of sails, incendiary weapons (fire pots, etc), chemical/biological weapons (I suppose venomeous snakes would qualify there), and dolphins (heavy weights suspended from the yardarms of merchantmen and dropped on the enemy ship when it closes). All in all, it is a very nice and detailed set of rules, and has provided me with some useful ideas.

The idea of one side maneuvering to maintain lines and the other to try and break it up is fine; as presumably this would mean that both would more or less maintain their formation until they one or the other got the upper hand. I have this idea of individual ships advancing from the opposing lines to try and ram or cut-out their opposing numbers in the opposing fleet while being "covered" by the ships behind them. And the maneuverable fleet want to sow chaos while operating in close support, while the less skilled fleet maintains close order to ensure close support.

[Cam]

Strategy, you're not the only one who is confused about how naval combat actually worked on a tactical level.  There's actually a profound lack of consensus in the secondary literature about even the most basic points, at least for the classical Greek period and, I supsect, the Hellenistic period as well.

For Greek tactics the fundamental problem seems to be whether or not the terms diekplous and periplous refer to tactics on the part of individual vessels or on the part of squadrons.  Here you need to be careful with Morrison:  he argues that both were squadron tactics, and in his book "The Athenian Trireme" this leads to an interesting reconstruction of the diekplous that seems to me to have a far stronger relationship to the Age of Nelson than to oared warships.  My own inclination is to see the diekplous as an attempt of an individual vessel to pierce an opposing line, not as the attempt of a squardon in line-ahead formation to cross the "T" as it were.  The periplous, on the other hand, seems to refer to envelopment/encirclement, the natural tactic of a numerically superior fleet.

I'm not sure how applicable the classical Greek experience is to the Hellenistic period, but you still might want to take a look at these articles:

J.F. Lazenby, "The Diekplous", Greece & Rome 34 (1987), 169-177

J.S. Morrison, "The Greek Ships at Salamis and the Diekplous", JHS 111 (1991), 196-200

Ian Whitehead, "The Periplous", Greece & Rome 34 (1987), 179 ff.

I have some comments I wrote on this stuff for a class I took a couple of years ago.  They're not terribly in-depth or anything, since they were just intended to serve as a starting point for discussion, but I can email them to you if you want to see what I think about Morrison et al. in relation to the Greek sources.

[Strategy]

Hi Cam,

Would be interested in reading your notes; you can either send them to my e-mail, or post them here if they are not too long.

Since Imperium is intended to be a pretty flexible gamign system, the game engine should be able to handle (almost) any kind of galley warfare prior to the advent of ship-board cannons.

Your caveat about the diekplous is interesting, because the only discussion I've seen on this tactic is as an line-astern formation resembling that of Nelson. I was not even aware that there existed a different school of thought on this (Morrison book is still waiting for me to pick it up at the local library). From a game-modelling perspective, however, the line-astern modelling of the diekplous seems very "all-or-nothing" which is bad. What you're proposing sounds much more interesting in that sense, since this could be modelled using two different unit stances: a breakthrough (diekplous) stance emphasizing aggressiveness and inflicting damage upon the enemy, versus the opposite stance, emphasizing maintaining cohesion. It would make sense combining such stances with basic unit tactics (ram, board, oar rake, bombard). Hmmm, got to pick up the Morrisson book soon... Thanks for the additional references.

[Cam]

Hi Strategy,

Unfortunately, the file with my notes in it has vanished somewhere into the dark bowels of my hard-drive.

I skimmed through Lazenby's article again while I was at the library, though, so I can summarize it briefly.  Basically, his argument is that there is pretty much no support at all in the ancient sources for the use of line-ahead formations in naval engagements.  The ONLY exception is Phormio in the Gulf of Corinth (Thuc. 2.84.1), but this is a special case since the enemy had formed a defensive circle with a bunch of transport vessels inside it and Phormio's goal was essentially to disrupt their formation by circling around them in ever tightening loops.

This exception aside, the general pattern, he argues, is one of deployment and attack in line abreast.  In support of this position he adduces a LONG list of philological evidence, ranging through Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius and Diodorus, drawing parallels with terminology used of, say, a line of hoplites etc.  Moreover, he also stresses that when diekplous is mentioned in the sources, it's always mentioned as a tactical option associated with each individual ship, which really does not cause one to presuppose that the authors have squadron formations and maneuvers in mind.

By the way, I don't know what I was thinking in my earlier post when I said that the periplous is a fleet/squadron maneuver.  I got it confused with encirclement, which is something else.  I agree with Whitehead that the periplous is a maneuver carried out by a single vessel.  I disagree with him, however, when he tries to present it as a tactical ALTERNATIVE to the diekplous.  In certain contexts it could be, but It seems to me hat it was generally the COMPLEMENT of a succesful diekplous.  Diekplous is the act of sliding through the enemy line; periplous is basically the trick of then pulling a tight, three-quarter circle around one of the ships you've just slid past and ramming it amidships. (See, for example, Polybius discussion of the Roman tactical position at Drepana, esp. 1.51.8ff)

I don't normally like to be this blunt, but I find Morrison's argument that these were squadron formations carried out in line-ahead formations completely nonsensical.  If you look at his diagram of the battle of Arginusai in "The Athenian Trireme", what you see is the Athenian fleet drawn up in blocks of ships 5-10 deep, and the Spartan fleet drawn up in 10 "lines ahead", each composed of 12 ships in single file.  I utterly fail to understand how these long lines would actually work.  Line Ahead is a perfectly natural formation in the Age of Sail, when the primary weapons point to starboard and port.  A fleet of cannon-equipped sail in defensive arrangement naturally maximizes its firepower when in line ahead; likewise the formation can be used by an attacking fleet to minimize its target aspect on approach and to facilitate "crossing the T".  In a galley, though, all primary weapons point to the FRONT.  This is obvious in the case of the ram, but even in boarding actions its probably a lot easier to bring the prow into contact with an enemy than it is to bring the gunwales into contact.  I don't know why you'd render your weapons inoperable by putting your ships in line ahead.  More importantly, I don't know why a commander with his ships deployed in a defensive formation would stay stationary as a long single file line of galleys approached instead of enveloping them and attacking from the sides.  These are GALLEYS, after all; they went into battle dismasted and relied 100% on oars, which gave them a lot of maneuverability.

Finally, I really don't see how the "line ahead" theory is compatible on any level with what is probably the best surviving discussion of how naval combat actually worked, namely Polybius' account of Drepana.  The picture I get from reading the account is basically this:  fleets would basically approach and engage in long lines abreast.  Initially there would probably be a lot of feinting, a lot of backing water and falling back (another reason why you wouldn't want ships BEHIND you), missile fire between marines, maybe some boarding actions.  Diekplous is basically an attack of opportunity; when the enemy ships in front of you are distracted by friendlies who are attacking, you slip through them, wheel around, ram from their aft quarters.  Generally, given considerations of training etc., one fleet will be in a more "defensive" posture, perhaps deployed in a double line to tackle ships breaking through the front, as the Athenians were at Arginusai.  You'd expect this kind of thing to degenerate into a full-fledged melee pretty quickly, with duels between small groups of ships, and if you read Xenophon on Arginusai this is in fact what you see.

Anyway, the point of this long and admittedly more than a little polemical post is to say that in my opinion you should definitely NOT try to model line-ahead tactics.

[Strategy]

Hmm - so the anastrophe would then be a combination-move diekplous-periplous? At least the description I usually read for it sounds very much like what you describe as the d-p move would be.

I'll be picking up Morrison later this evening, and have already ordered Rome & Greece. But I essentially agree with your assessment; line ahead formation does seem to me to have some problems as a combat formation. I could see it being useful for deploying of ships - follow the leader always being an easy way to rapidly deploy (either ships or troops) - but I really can't make much sense of it as a fighting formation.

I am surprised however that Morrison's views is the only one I've seen suggested in all of the literature I've read (little of it as there is on naval warfare).

[Cam]

Not a lot of people have disputed Morrioson's position.  Lazenby is one.  Casson is another, I'm pretty sure, unless I'm completely failing to remember what he has to day about the matter in his books.

Hmm - so the anastrophe would then be a combination-move diekplous-periplous? At least the description I usually read for it sounds very much like what you describe as the d-p move would be.

Whitehead actually touches on this in the Periplous article in G&R.  His view is that anastrophe can sometimes be used as a virtual synonym for periplous, and at other times can be used to refer to more general maneuvers of wheeling, pursuing, and retreating, on the analogy of the use of the term in cavalry tactics.

[Strategy]

Having just started on Morrison's books, I'm struck by the incompleteness of evidence on many of his conclusions; I guess I'm beginning to understand why not many want to explore these issues. But generally very interesting stuff all round (and he does acknowledge that there are diverging opinions on the diekplus stuff). I just wish he didn't have all the greek text all over the place - while I can usually guess the words, its a real pain to read.

/Strategy

[Cam]

I just wish he didn't have all the greek text all over the place - while I can usually guess the words, its a real pain to read.

I read Greek, and I feel the same way.  

[Nikanarchon]

I would have to say I agree with Cam's assessment about the manouevres of diekplous and periplous being ship manouevres or ships in line-abreast, not squadrons in line astern.
My Greek is pretty lousy, but that was my understanding of the battle descriptions in Thuc, Xen, Diod etc.
I think the ships were marshalled/grouped in squadrons, but that the manouevres were line or lines abreast.
Periplous is interesting, as I always understood it to be going round the edge of the enemy line, but as Cam says, it might be circling once you have achieved diekplous. And certainly that is what you would want to do (circle back) after achieving diekplous.

[Wisdom]

http://www.hannibalbarca.org/SHIPPAGE39.html

small thing to know of ships from Carthago

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Rome develops a navy (261-260 BC)

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Carthage was the great maritime power of the age. The rich Carthaginian overseas trade was able to support huge fleets by the standard of the time. This allowed them to take a virtual monopoly on trade in the western Mediterranean. At that time the Carthaginians boasted that no man could wash his hands in the salt water without their permission.

The Romans, since the earliest times, had not been known as great seafarers. They had not a single decked vessel, and in order to transport their troops across the straits they were obliged to borrow triremes from the Italian-Greeks. During the war the Roman legions met with early successes on the landward parts of Sicily, but at the same time the superior Carthaginian fleets ravaged the coasts of both that island and the Italian peninsula. It soon became apparent that mastery of the seas was of paramount importance if Rome were to progress further.

The Roman Senate now ordered the construction of 120 warships: 100 quinqueremes and 20 triremes that were completed in two months. Polybius says the Romans used a beached Carthaginian ship as a model. The Romans trained the crews on rowing machines during the sixty day period it took to construct the fleet: 30,000 Italian rowers were trained: 300 to a ship (they were supplemented by 120 marines per ship).

In the spring of 260 BC, the Roman fleet had been completed and outfitted, and set off down the coast of Italy toward Sicily. However, they were still no match for the Carthaginians in seafaring skill and initially the Romans were not successful at sea.

Their solution was a new "secret weapon" the corvus, (‘raven’ or ‘crow’ in Latin) which may have been copied from the Athenians at Syracuse. The corvus was a 35 foot long spiked boarding bridge, mounted on a swivel so that it could be turned and dropped on an adjacent enemy vessel. A large spike at the end of the corvus bit into the other ship, locking the two craft together. Then the Roman marines, who were in a larger proportion to the crew than on Carthaginian ships, would storm across and engage the enemy, thus turning a sea battle into a 'land battle' where the deadly Roman infantry skills could be put to use.This effectively converted a sea battle into a land battle.

[Wisdom]

http://www.barca.fsnet.co.uk/Graphics/map-punic.gif

Small thing to know.....